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Abstract One of the key functions or purposes of international law (and law in 
general for that matter) is to provide long-term stability and legal certainty. Yet, 
international legal rules may also function as tools to deal with non-permanent or 
constantly changing issues, and rather than stable, international law may have to 
be flexible or adaptive. Prima facie, one could think of two main types of tem-
porary aspects relevant from the perspective of international law. First, the nature 
of the object addressed by international law or the ‘problem’ that international 
law aims to address may be inherently temporary (temporary objects). Second, 
a subject of international law may be created for a specific period of time, after 
the elapse of which this entity ceases to exist (temporary subjects). These types 
of temporariness raise several questions from the perspective of international law, 
which are hardly addressed from a more conceptual perspective. This volume of 
the Netherlands Yearbook of International Law aims to do exactly that by asking 
the question of how international law reacts to various types of temporary issues. 
Put differently, where does international law stand on the continuum of predict-
ability and pragmatism when it comes to temporary issues or institutions?
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1.1  Introduction
One of the key functions or purposes of international law (and law in general for 
that matter)1 is to provide long-term stability and legal certainty. Indeed, when 
adopting conventions, drafting treaties, making regulations generally the idea is not 
that those rules will elapse. Think, for instance, of human rights conventions the 
endurance of which is ensured by rather general formulations. Yet, international 
legal rules may also function as tools to deal with non-permanent or constantly 
changing issues, and rather than stable, international law may have to be flexible or 
adaptive. Hersch Lauterpacht discussed this question in terms of a struggle 
between change and stability and justice and security. And he pointed out that 
‘[e]xperience teaches that in this struggle the element of change is not always vic-
torious, for the simple reason that stability and security are in themselves a power-
ful constituent element of justice.’2 In his view, ‘[a]t present international law is 
more static than any other law not only because of the absence of an international 
legislature, but principally because it regulates relations which are not in them-
selves liable to be affected in a decisive manner by economic and other changes.’3 
Whether this observation still holds true today is one of the main questions that is 
addressed in this volume of the Netherlands Yearbook of International Law. 
According to Lauterpacht, one of the reasons for the insistence by international law 
on status quo is the absence of an international legislature which could deliberately 
change this situation. So far no such legislature has been created4, which then 
raises the question how could international law, if at all, still react to or be influ-
enced by changes, thus temporary issues. More concretely, what are the tools at the 
disposition of international law through which temporariness is dealt with.
Prima facie, one could think of two main types of temporary aspects relevant 
from the perspective of international law. First, the nature of the object addressed 
1
 Provided that ‘law’ is driven by the rule of law and not by undemocratic or authoritarian ideas.
2
 Lauterpacht 2011, at 256.
3
 Ibid., at 257–258.
4
 Apart perhaps from the fact that international organizations are increasingly seen as contribut-
ing to ‘international legislation’. See Wessel 2015.
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by international law or the ‘problem’ that international law aims to address may 
be inherently temporary (temporary objects). While the object of regulation itself 
does not cease to exist, its features are bound to change throughout time. These 
changes are generally unknown or difficult to predict. In these cases regulations 
aim to address moving targets. Examples of this type of temporariness are abun-
dant: climate change, migration, developing countries, belligerent occupations and 
so on. Oftentimes this type of temporariness is studied through concepts that are 
aimed to deal with changes and uncertainty, such as risk management and regula-
tion, precaution or resilience.
Second, a subject of international law may be created for a specific period 
of time, after the lapse of which this entity ceases to exist (temporary subjects). 
These subjects mainly concern the establishment of institutions or certain entities. 
Examples of such temporary institutions are also ample in international law: ter-
ritorial administrations, states in transition, the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda and for the former Yugoslavia and so on. The mainstream discussion with 
regard to this type of temporariness seems to focus on questions of justice, fairness 
and accountability.
In addition to the above-mentioned approaches, these types of temporariness 
raise several questions from the perspective of international law, which are hardly 
addressed from a more conceptual perspective. This volume of the Netherlands 
Yearbook of International Law aims to do exactly that, including the follow-
ing questions. How does international law deal with matters that are non-perma-
nent? What happens to international law when the originally temporary creatures 
become permanent? What is the effect of temporary regulations on matters that 
are permanent? How does temporariness affect legal certainty? These and related 
questions are addressed in the contributions of this volume of the Yearbook from 
various perspectives in order to explore the impact of temporariness on interna-
tional law, namely how international law reacts to various types of temporary 
issues. Put differently, where does international law stand on the continuum of 
predictability and pragmatism when it comes to temporary issues or institutions?
Rather than providing a summary of each contribution, this introduction places 
the chapters within the above indicated framework of the two main forms of tem-
porariness. After introducing these forms of temporariness as addressed in this 
volume, this chapter will discuss how these forms relate to and what effect they 
have or can have on international law. In order to gain further insights into the 
nature of temporariness, the chapter also highlights the main concepts associated 
or contrasted with the notion of temporariness in the concluding chapter.
1.2  Forms of Temporariness
This section introduces these two main forms of temporariness as addressed in the 
chapters without exploring their impact on international law, which is the subject 
of the next section.
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1.2.1  Temporary Objects
An outstanding example of temporary objects is climate change, which is explored 
in van Asselt’s chapter. This object is temporary in the sense that, as the name 
already indicates, the climate is undergoing certain changes; i.e. its nature varies 
or might vary from time to time, which is influenced, among others, by techno-
logical advances, socio-economic conditions and demographic developments. In 
addition, due to developments and shifts in scientific insights the manner in which 
climate change is seen is also prone to changes. Put differently, from time to time 
this problem needs to be tackled differently—i.e. a solution at a given moment 
in time might not work at another moment. Accordingly, a particular mechanism 
addressing the problem is quasi per definitionem temporary.
Another widely known example of a temporary object in international law is 
the situation of refuge-seekers. While refugees are generally seen as subjects of 
international law, the problem surrounding them can rather be described as the 
object of regulation. As Durieux’s chapter describes, the nature of refugee pro-
tection is inherently temporary, though in a somewhat different manner than that 
of climate change: the general purpose of this regime is to re-establish the rela-
tionship between the original state of nationality and provide a temporary solu-
tion until then—thus regarding the regime as an ‘exception’. I.e. the problem is 
generally seen as temporary, while in the case of climate change the problem has 
become temporary due to the changes involved. Nevertheless, the refugee protec-
tion regime is also subject to changes—making it temporary in a different manner. 
Namely, the refugees change, the number of refugees to be ‘tackled’ at a certain 
point in time is also subject to change, and obviously the domestic situation in the 
receiving state as well as in the state of origin also varies in many respects—which 
might also have impact on the way in which temporary protection can and will be 
provided to those who are escaping from their state of origin.
As explained in Criddle’s chapter, national crises or emergencies are also 
temporary ‘problems’ that in general justify the somewhat reduced protection of 
human rights, i.e. the adoption of human right derogations. Put differently, the 
temporary problem here is the lower level of protection of human rights, which 
depends on the particular circumstances of the emergency situation. Similarly to 
refugee protection, the problem here is inherently and strictly temporary. As soon 
as the crisis or emergency ends, derogations should be eliminated too.
As opposed to human rights derogations, affirmative action measures rather 
provide a higher level of protection, as discussed in Addis’ chapter. When affirma-
tive actions or positive action measures are needed, the problem that needs to be 
addressed is inequality that stems from past discriminatory treatment. In other 
words, affirmative action measures aim to heal the consequences of a differential 
treatment adopted in the past, which has resulted in an unequal situation in the 
present. Nevertheless, they are similar to human rights derogations in that they 
will need to cease to exist after a period of time, namely when equal opportunities 
have been created.
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Questions like these relate to an overarching objective of international law: a 
stable rule of law. If one perceives the international rule of law as the framework 
to provide stability and fairness (following domestic democratic notions based on 
that idea), the question is to what extent it can be combined with temporary issues. 
Ranchordás answer to this is that temporary institutions and rules can actually 
 promote the international rule of law, providing more flexible solutions for the 
long-term achievement of a stable rule of law. In fact, as she argues, ‘temporary 
certainty can contribute to thicker definitions of the rule of law including long-
standing justice and protection of human rights.’5
In a way, this reveals that, international law itself (or at least parts of it) could 
also be regarded as an object of temporariness. In fact, one could argue that some 
temporariness is inherent in the sources of international law. Considering the main 
ones: custom is inherently fluid and allows international law to change according 
to adapted practices and legal opinions. While the objective of written law is to 
overcome uncertainties and provide ‘fixed’ interpretations, treaties are often seen 
as ‘living instruments’, the interpretation of which may follow new insights and 
developments. In fact, as the contribution of Merkouris indicates, treaty law itself 
allows for change over time. In the law of treaties ‘subsequent practice’, ‘subse-
quent agreements’, ‘relevant rules’ and ‘supplementary means’ play an essential 
role and discussions often relate to the tension between the intentions of the draft-
ers and the ways in which these play out later.
As legal scholars, we are not merely observers of changes in international law. 
Scholarly insights are equally temporary and obviously contribute to changes in 
the international rules. The ‘shift from eternity (natural law) to temporality 
(changeable law)’ is man-made. In his contribution, Djeffal points to the influence 
of paradigm changes over time. The question raised in his contribution is whether 
in the dialectal process from atemporality to temporality, we can see a new para-
digm termed ‘fluxus’: asserting that the law is necessarily moving and changing 
and hardly ascertainable. ‘Under such an assumption, predicting the law generally 
means to predict the next decision. The temporal focus is, therefore, on the next 
moment.’6
Similarly, international law, as object of temporariness, may be challenged to 
remedy flaws in its system. When structural solutions are out of sight due to, for 
instance, political controversies, temporary solutions may be in order, and accept-
able to the international community. The present collection offers ample exam-
ples of such temporary ‘repairs’, including the establishment of ad hoc  tribunals. 
An example that has received quite some attention of the past years concerns 
the immunity of international organisations. As an almost inherent element of 
the international system, structural changes are not to be foreseen in the imme-
diate future. Yet, international organisations change and are increasingly active 
in rule-making that has effects on individuals. Taylor’s contribution points to 
5
 Ranchordás 2015.
6
 Djeffal 2015.
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accountability gaps in this regard, in particular in relation to private claims. The 
question then is whether unpreferred consequences of systemic choices can be 
remedied by allowing for temporary solutions (in this concrete case: dealing with 
5000 private law claims which emerged in response to the allegedly negligent 
importation of cholera into Haiti by UN peacekeepers).
1.2.2  Temporary Subjects
An outstanding example of temporary subjects is the so called commissions of 
inquiry (CoIs). As explored in Henderson’s chapter, these subjects are being estab-
lished as a reaction to an incident in an ad hoc manner. It seems that, in addition 
to the political difficulties involved in negotiating the establishment of a perma-
nent (quasi-)judicial body, the nature of the incidents justifies the creation of such 
ad hoc mechanisms. These commissions are established for investigating (mainly) 
the facts of a specific international incident involving two or more states. As 
Henderson explains,
[t]hese contemporary CoIs, while not producing legally binding outcomes, nonetheless 
carry out various adjudicative functions, from determining applicable legal frameworks 
and the scope of the legal rules and norms in question to determining whether particular 
acts amount to violations of these rules and norms.7
He even indicates that CoIs
offer what may be the only, or at least most formal, treatment of the legal issues raised in 
the context of a particular conflict or crisis, and perhaps represent an important shift in the 
modus operandi of the international community in seeking at least some accountability 
for violations of international law.8
Temporariness of subjects of international law can also take a different form, as 
illustrated in Bohlander’s chapter. Although there is a permanent court for pun-
ishing those responsible for the most serious crimes, international criminal justice 
still seems to favour temporary solutions, as Bohlander points out. More specifi-
cally, he argues that the present criminal tribunals have been set up in an ad hoc 
manner, resulting in not-well-thought-through procedural rules and thus repre-
senting a mix of the two main systems, namely the adversarial and the judge-led 
models. This approach leaves quite some room for judicial trial and error—reflect-
ing another temporary dimension of these institutions. In this case, temporariness 
relates to the functioning of specific institutions, or put differently, temporariness 
is visible in the main legal features of the operation of these institutions. The insti-
tutions themselves might be established on a permanent basis, but the manner in 
which they carry out their work is characterised by temporary elements.
7
 Henderson 2015.
8
 Ibid.
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Galbraith, at a more theoretical level, examines the impact of temporary institu-
tions, or more broadly, temporary regimes on international law. Two of her exam-
ples can be seen as addressing temporary objects (refugee law as well as climate 
change), while the example of international criminal law can be related to temporary 
subjects. In this regard, her contribution shows that these two aspects of temporari-
ness can clearly be compared as to their general effect on permanent regimes. She 
examines through different theories (rational design approach, historical institution-
alism, constructivism and behavioural international law) the reasons behind these 
temporary ‘regimes’ as well as the manner in which they shape permanent ones.
Last but not least, Uruena’s chapter approaches the question of temporariness 
in a somewhat different manner. Rather than looking at the temporary subjects as 
defined above, he analyses the so-called ‘permanent subjects’. In his view, even 
though many of the subjects of international law are established as permanent 
‘institutions’, this permanency does not mean that they are static, i.e. that they do 
not change. Put differently, even permanent institutions can be seen as temporary 
ones, given their dynamic existence that is steered by interaction among the vari-
ous actors/subjects of international law. Such a dynamic is, however, difficult to be 
discovered given the constant present used in international law. This dynamic also 
implies that the permanence of institutions is relational: ‘international norms and 
institutions are “permanent” or “provisional” in comparison to other international 
norms and institutions.’9
1.3  International Law and Change
Both temporary objects and subjects have an interesting relationship with interna-
tional law. This section looks at this relationship through the lenses of the chapters 
in this volume.
1.3.1  Temporary Objects and International Law
The chapters addressing temporary objects of international law essentially focus 
on the relationship between these objects and international law: how does inter-
national law enable the regulation of these objects, what is the role of permanent 
institutions in this regard, and how does a temporary measure impact upon a gen-
eral norm?
Concerning climate change as a temporary object of international law, van 
Asselt’s chapter argues that the ‘changing circumstances make it challenging to 
govern the problem of climate change through a single set of rules fixed in time, 
9
 Uruena 2015 (emphasis in original).
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and therefore point to the need for a flexible, dynamic and adaptive legal system.’ 
He, however, also admits that ‘[a]t the same time, the flexibility necessary to 
address the temporary nature of the subject matter may well challenge one of the 
core rationales of legal norms: to provide legal certainty and predictability and, 
more broadly, to uphold the rule of law.’10 In other words, a changing problem 
needs legal answers that can adjust to the extent the problems require. To put it 
bluntly, temporary problems require temporary solutions. Such temporary solu-
tions, so the argument goes, can be ‘produced’ if certain flexibility mechanisms are 
built into the legal regime. His chapter examines to what extent the regime of cli-
mate change can be regarded as flexible. Analysing its various aspects, he finds 
that ‘flexibility has been the rule rather than the exception in the design of the 
United Nations climate change regime.’11 Nevertheless, he admits that in practice 
the regime still faces certain challenges. In his view, ‘the adaptability of the cli-
mate regime is limited in at least two important respects: the evolution of commit-
ments in accordance with changing national circumstances and changing the 
overall ambition in light of new scientific evidence.’12 All in all, the chapter sug-
gests that international law has tried to cope with the fact that climate change is an 
object that requires temporary solutions, i.e. flexibility. Accordingly, the temporary 
object did have a significant impact on the design and functioning of the interna-
tional legal regime that regulates this object, and thus this regime can be character-
ised as pragmatic, which nevertheless ensures predictability.
As far as migration or refuge, another temporary object in international law, is 
concerned, Durieux’s chapter explores how international law reacted to the tempo-
rary problem of ‘refuge time’. The international legal regime on refugee protection 
includes several ‘temporal’ aspects as a reaction to the special nature of the ref-
uge situation. First, over time the position of the refugee should be brought closer 
to that of citizens. Second, a deadline is set as to until when the refugee can be 
regarded as refugee, in order to avoid that this status last longer than desirable. As 
Durieux explains
[t]he management of “refuge time” is the source of an obvious tension within the 1951 
Convention regime. Premature return to a continuing situation of persecution or violence 
is clearly prohibited by the non-refoulement principle. … Meanwhile, attachment leads to 
integration, which becomes the default solution.13
In the 1980s the focus was on the free will of the refugee to return. However, in the 
1990s the question of what the host state can do in order to ‘convince’ the refugee 
to return home (‘promote voluntary repatriation’) has become rather urgent, given 
the crisis in Yugoslavia. This has led to the emergence of the concept of ‘tempo-
rary protection’ in Europe. This concept has tried to solve the tension between 
the focus on return and integration by placing a strong focus on the return aspect. 
10
 van Asselt 2015.
11
 Ibid. (emphasis in original).
12
 Ibid.
13
 Durieux 2015.
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Indeed, it was defined as ‘a return-oriented protection mechanism’. While in 
Europe temporary protection has been regulated, within the UN it was only loosely 
referred to. So one can see an interesting parallel development here: while at the 
UN level the emerging crisis did not lead to any formal or practical changes in 
the approach towards refugees, at the EU level a new approach was adopted and 
applied. In the latter case the temporary problem has had a huge impact on the 
manner in which the refuge problem was treated and actually shifted the focus 
from finding a balance towards promoting return, while in the former case the 
problem did not lead to much visible change thus creating some tensions concern-
ing large-scale influx of refugees. Put in more abstract terms, at the European level 
a concrete crisis has induced the adoption of a specific approach towards all refuge 
situations, while at the international level it was not possible to create an exception 
even for such a crisis. One might say that Europe has adopted a more pragmatic 
approach as opposed to the international level’s seeming focus on predictability.
Emergency or crisis situations can also be addressed by adopting temporary 
measures that allow for certain derogations from human rights. The leading human 
rights agreements formulate such derogation possibilities in a rather broad manner, 
though generally enshrining that certain steps need to be followed. The question 
can then be raised how these broad standards can be translated into rules. An 
increasingly frequently emerging response to this question is ‘[t]he idea that inter-
national law needs to develop more concrete rules for human rights derogation’.14 
However, this has so far not happened, and most probably will not happen soon. 
How can then these standards be seen? ‘Should derogation standards be under-
stood primarily as delegations of rule-making authority to international courts and 
commissions? Or should they be construed as delegations to states to develop 
“rules adapted to their special needs”?’15 In simple and more general terms, the 
question that is raised with regard to human rights derogations in Criddle’s chapter 
is the following: who is authorised under international law to decide on the con-
crete temporary measures? The underlying idea behind this allocation of authority 
can be related to the point made in van Asselt’s chapter, namely flexibility or prag-
matism. Emergency situations vary per situation and per country. Accordingly, they 
also require a response that can be fit to the particular case, thus the possibility to 
derogate from human rights needs to be adaptable to this case, hence requiring 
flexibility. Based on the case-law of the most relevant human rights international 
adjudicative bodies, Criddle’s chapter identifies that international human rights law 
(HRL) essentially ‘entrusts states with [the] primary responsibility to determine 
what measures are necessary to protect and fulfil human rights for their people 
 during national crises.’16 I.e. international law considers states as the most 
 appropriate actors to adopt measures that are suitable for addressing an emergency. 
14
 Criddle 2015.
15
 Ibid.
16
 Ibid.
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‘Broad derogation standards are the mechanisms HRL employs to structure its 
jurisprudence of altruism, empowering states to design temporary human rights 
regimes that are tailored to the specific exigencies of particular national crises.’17 
Nevertheless, human rights courts provide the final guarantee ‘that states do not 
abuse their discretionary power’.18 While in general, given this role of states, a def-
erential approach is adopted by international courts, the judicial deference should 
be ‘conditioned upon the state serving as a faithful trustee for its people’,19 so the 
argument goes. Essentially one could then conclude that international law through 
laying down a broad standard as well as judicial deference ensures that there is 
ample flexibility when the adoption of emergency measures is needed, whereby it 
can be qualified as an example of a pragmatic approach, which at the same time 
aims to ensure predictability.
One might conceive affirmative actions as comparable to human rights deroga-
tions, given that on the face of it, they also seem to deviate from the general rules, 
in this specific case from the idea of equality, in the sense that they entitle a group 
to special protection. However, as Addis’ chapter argues, ‘the analogy with emer-
gency exceptions is misplaced and the worry that these measures will undercut the 
very coherence of the norm of equality is unwarranted.’20 In other words, affirma-
tive actions do not ‘undermine the coherence and predictability of the norm 
itself.’21 ‘They suspend non-discrimination in its narrow and formal sense while 
preparing the ground for a broader and more robust notion of equality.’22 I.e. they 
actually ‘do not leave the general norm of equality in suspension for a temporary 
period.’23 In a more general sense, Addis’ chapter clearly illustrates that a tempo-
rary measure can have a long-term effect on a general concept under international 
law, namely it can change and complement its meaning, thus contributing to its 
predictability even though the measure itself might be regarded as a pragmatic one.
As noted above, predictability may also be assured by structurally including 
‘temporality’ in an international legal regime. As we have seen, international treaty 
law—as analysed by Merkouris—forms a good example of a legal regime allow-
ing for change. Treaties, as key objects of international law, are meant to stabi-
lise the system and provide legal certainty. Yet, treaty law allows for temporary 
solutions and dynamic interpretations over time. The reason for this is obvious: 
by not allowing ‘time’ to affect the interpretation of international agreements, they 
would run the risk of becoming dead letters rather than accepted bases for inter-
national cooperation. A similar notion lies behind the flexible solutions described 
by Ranchordás, where she points to the fact that, in the end, these contribute to a 
17
 Ibid.
18
 Ibid.
19
 Ibid.
20
 Addis 2015.
21
 Ibid.
22
 Ibid.
23
 Ibid.
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stable rule of law, as well as a further promotion and consolidation of the rule of 
law. Taylor’s chapter, while highlighting their caveats, also suggests that tempo-
rary solutions could contribute to closing, at least to a certain extent the account-
ability gap regarding international organisations.
1.3.2  Temporary Subjects and International Law
The chapters looking at temporary subjects essentially focus on the relationship 
between these subjects and international law: how does international law facilitate 
or enable the creation of such subjects; how do they affect international law in a 
more general sense; and how does international law actually accommodate these 
subjects or their temporary features?
Henderson’s chapter argues that international law, and more specifically cer-
tain features of international adjudication, makes it possible or facilitates the crea-
tion of and reliance on these institutions. Put differently, this chapter looks into 
the question how permanent subjects of international law actually enable or even 
promote the emergence of such commissions. In his view, there are at least three 
features of international law that can be ‘blamed’ for such a promotion: the for-
mality of international adjudication, the principle of non-intervention, and proce-
dural fairness. CoIs are such temporary institutions that can avoid falling in the 
trap of these features. Temporariness can thus be seen as providing correction to 
some negative impacts of permanent institutions, thus their existence might be best 
explained by a pragmatic approach.
In a somewhat different manner, Bohlander’s chapter explores the impact of 
temporary criminal justice solutions on international (criminal) law. He argues 
that the so called ‘draft-as-you-go’ approach, thus the application of temporary 
solutions, rather than well-thought-through models as well as the room provided 
through this approach for judicial trial and error,
open[…] the building of the administration of justice up to intruders with separate agen-
das and to political negotiations that would appear to fit and fix the temporary emergency 
and to fill the temporary gaps in the law needed for the fixing.24
Such an approach, in other words, can have serious consequences as far as the 
legitimacy of these permanent institutions and legal certainty are concerned—so 
the argument goes. I.e. embedding in the main features of international criminal 
law systems such temporary solutions clearly has a negative impact on interna-
tional criminal justice. Accordingly, the pragmatic approach adopted in this case 
clearly has a negative impact on the predictability of international law.
As indicated above, Uruena’s chapter argues that even the so-called ‘permanent’ 
institutions and rules are constantly in the process of change, even though the lan-
guage of international law suggests a constant present: ‘international law approaches 
24
 Bohlander 2015.
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norms and institutions as though they had always been there. Once change occurs, it 
approaches new (or changed) norms and institutions as if those norms had always 
been there.’25 He suggests then to think about change, thus temporariness, in a 
somewhat different manner. As indicated above, he argues that the permanency of 
these institutions and norms is relational, which enables us ‘to think of norms, not as 
discrete utterances, but rather as part of a wider landscape in which the temporal and 
the permanent help define each other.’26 Accordingly, he suggests that we use the 
notion of ‘global regulatory space’ in which various forces exert different pulls. So 
permanence is impossible, ‘which is triggered by the constant movement of all the 
objects in the global regulatory space.’27 And the result of this interaction between 
the various actors is a particular state of art in international law. Put differently, he 
aims to discover the underlying ideas behind, or, as he calls it, the ‘deep grammar’ 
of change in international law, even though this theory would not change the percep-
tion of seeing norms and institutions as ‘static’ or as ‘discrete events’. The theory of 
incremental change based on the proposed ‘gravitational pull’, however, has its own 
caveats or challenges, namely tunnel vision and regulatory capture. The former 
implies that ‘[t]alking in terms of a “gravitational force” creates the risk of losing 
sight of an overarching narrative of a “good” society.’ The latter danger is that the 
global regulatory space makes it possible for private actors to exert influence on the 
decision-making relying on gravitational pull. Such influence could have desired as 
well as negative impact. In order to avoid these caveats, Uruena’s suggestion is to set 
up a normative framework based on which one could devise a ‘vocabulary to per-
form a critique of the reasons behind such a powerful pull’.28 Whether or not it is 
necessary to assess the ‘appropriateness’ of the extent of ‘pull’ of certain norms and 
institutions is up for debate. Nevertheless, such a pull can be seen as incorporating 
pragmatism in the permanent institutions in a manner that might negatively impact 
predictability, given the fact that they are difficult to identify and foresee. In any 
event it is of utmost importance to have a vocabulary for exploring the nature of 
changes even in permanent institutions that are inherently also temporary given the 
workings of the various pulling forces. In light of the other chapters, the question 
could be raised how are then so-called temporary institutions and rules different 
from the so-defined ‘permanent ones’ other than the basic rules establishing them?
Similarly to Bohlander’s chapter, Galbraith’s contribution also examined the 
impact of concrete temporary subjects on permanent ones (or on international law 
in a broader sense) but from a more theoretical perspective. She examined how 
four different theories of state behaviour would and could explain the impact these 
temporary regimes might have on future permanent regimes. All theories she stud-
ied indicate that the impact of temporary regimes on permanent ones is not 
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negligible. First, ‘a rational design approach suggests that states can iron out mis-
takes or adjust to new conditions in ways that are not overly influenced by the 
structure of the temporary regime.’29 Second, ‘[u]nder a historical institutionalist 
perspective, one would expect the design choices made for temporary regimes to 
have outsized influence in some but not all contexts.’ Probably this theory provides 
the best explanation as to the creation of commissions of inquiry, as described in 
Henderson’s chapter. Third, the constructivist approach suggests that ‘the power of 
the temporary regimes is largely in strengthening the norms of governmental and 
other actors in favour of the objective of the regime.’ The ‘pull’ discussed in 
Uruena’s chapter concerning the changes in permanent institutions could be best 
explained based on this theory. Last, ‘a behavioural international law approach 
would suggest that temporary regimes are always sticky, with the magnitude vary-
ing based on the extent to which these regimes serve as defaults or reference 
points.’30 This last one is actually the point made by Bohlander. Interestingly, all 
these theories seem to try to find a balance between pragmatism and predictabil-
ity—change is necessary, but certain elements need to be added in order to ensure 
predictability. They suggest that actually no choice should be made between prag-
matism and predictability, as they can be both facilitated and maintained at the 
same time.
All in all, we can conclude that temporariness (or permanency) is relational. 
Nevertheless, this temporal element of either the objects or the subjects of inter-
national law has impact on international law. While it seems that concerning tem-
porary objects there is an underlying aim to ensure both predictability and at the 
same time being pragmatic, as far as temporary subjects are concerned a prag-
matic approach might turn out to have a negative impact on predictability. This 
difference might be explained by the difference between objects and subjects as 
such. Subjects of international law have ‘independent’ living and functioning, and 
they oftentimes want to set up their own approaches, mechanisms etc. Objects of 
international law, however, are subject to regulation, which most likely will ensure 
predictability when addressing a problem.
1.4  Conclusion: All Relative?
A popular view on temporariness in international law may be that it potentially 
harms the already quite shaky international legal order. Indeed, as we argued in 
our introduction to this chapter, one of the key functions or purposes of interna-
tional law is to provide long-term stability and legal certainty. In analysing the 
different views on temporariness, we may conclude that this element is certainly 
29
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present, but that the opposite is also visible. Depending on whether positive or 
negative meanings are associated with temporariness, a particular expectation is 
created, thus having an impact on the response provided, too.
With regard to temporary objects where the issue or object is changing (and is 
thus temporary), this change is simply seen as a given that needs to be addressed in 
one way or another; i.e. the association with temporariness is definitely not negative. 
The general response to this change is the need for having ‘flexibility’ mechanisms 
built into the system. The system then can be criticised if it lacks or does not suffi-
ciently embed such mechanisms. In addition, temporariness is also seen in this con-
text as a phenomenon that can provide meaning, thus influence the interpretation of 
otherwise permanent concepts—as, for instance, illustrated in Addis’ chapter.
Unlike temporary objects, the temporary subjects of international law are asso-
ciated with both positive and negative features. As far as the positive features 
are concerned, it has been highlighted that temporary institutions can be seen as 
correcting, at least to a certain extent, the deficits of so-called permanent institu-
tions. Moreover, temporariness is also contrasted with being static, through which 
temporariness is essentially seen as a form of flexibility or dynamism. However, 
Bohlander’s chapter, for instance, also highlights the dangers of ‘ad hocism’ as a 
form of temporariness as opposed to well-thought-through regimes. In this latter 
case, temporariness thus obtains a negative association.
It is the search for this balance between pragmatism and predictability that 
seems to form the thread through our analysis of the different perspectives. At 
the same time these two notions should not always be contrasted, as, for instance, 
illustrated by Criddle’s chapter. Under certain circumstances, pragmatism may 
contribute to predictability as the latter is not only based on static international 
law, but may require dynamism and change to remain relevant. The chapters in the 
present volume underline that change is not something that we should see as an 
exception; in many cases it is a structural or systemic part of the international legal 
system.
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